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‘‘ I Was Going to Build a new
Republican Party and a New
Majority ’’ : Richard Nixon as
Party Leader, 1969–731
ROBERT MASON
Richard Nixon gained a poor reputation as President for his work as leader
of the Republican Party. His attitude towards the party was seen as neglectful
at best, destructive at worst. It was clear that Nixon revelled in the details of
electoral politics as far as his own position was concerned, but it seemed
equally clear that he had little concern for the political fortunes of his party at
large.2 Among the most partisan of American politicians during his earlier
career, Nixon seemed to shrug oﬀ this partisan past when he reached the
White House in 1969. But this understanding of Nixon’s relationship with
the Republican Party is in some respects misleading. Although it is true that
his record provides signiﬁcant examples of presidential neglect of the party,
it also contains equally signiﬁcant examples of presidential concern about the
party’s future. Few American Presidents of the modern era paid much
attention to their responsibility for party leadership, so the nature of Nixon’s
support for the Republicans distinguishes him as a party leader of notable
strength rather than notable weakness.
This, then, is an ambiguous record. It is the minority status of the
Republican Party that oﬀers a partial explanation for the ambiguity. It explains
Nixon’s frequent desire to distance himself from his party – particularly
Robert Mason is lecturer in history at the University of Edinburgh. He would like to thank
Owen Dudley Edwards, Rhodri Jeﬀreys-Jones, Byron Shafer and seminar audiences in
Edinburgh, London and Manchester, as well as anonymous reviewers, for their helpful
comments and suggestions.
1 This is a comment made by Nixon to his aide Monica Crowley in 1993. Monica Crowley,
Nixon Oﬀ the Record (New York : Random House, 1996), 149.
2 See, for example, Harold F. Bass, Jr., ‘‘The President and Political Parties, ’’ in Michael
Nelson, ed., Guide to the Presidency, 2nd ed., vol. I (Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly, 1996), 826–27, and James W. Davis, The President as Party Leader (New York:
Praeger, 1992), 196–97.
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during the presidential campaigns of 1968 and 1972 – because he had little to
gain and much to lose by stressing his Republican identity at a time when
more Americans considered themselves Democrats. But it also explains his
wish to strengthen the party, because the Democratic control of Congress
jeopardized the achievement of his goals in public policy, especially with
respect to the war in Vietnam. This is why Nixon took a diﬀerent view of
party leadership from that of his recent predecessors, who had discovered
little need to devote serious attention to this role, because party mattered
relatively little to the successes and failures of the presidency.3
The development of the modern presidency during the New Deal
involved ‘‘ the transcendence of partisan politics, ’’ according to Sidney
Milkis, as the executive branch, rather than the legislative, amassed new
responsibilities to meet the social and economic problems of the day. The
approach to government adopted during the New Deal emphasized an
enlarged White House, together with an array of executive departments and
agencies, amounting to a framework of government through administrative
rather than party channels. But this conception of government contained a
signiﬁcant ﬂaw. In permitting the President to conduct government business
largely through the executive branch, it assumed that Congress would remain
broadly supportive of presidential actions.4 This was not true for Nixon, the
ﬁrst President since Zachary Taylor in 1849 to begin his term facing a hostile
Congress. The problems of divided government had a number of impli-
cations for the nature of Nixon’s presidency. First, they sometimes induced
him to rein in partisan passions that might alienate Democrats whose
support he needed. Second, they often supported a desire to strengthen
further the capacity and responsibilities of the executive branch in order
to circumvent the role of the legislative branch, signiﬁcantly increasing
institutional conﬂict. Finally – and, because the ﬁrst two implications
fostered non-partisan behaviour, paradoxically – they led Nixon to think
creatively and constructively about boosting the strength of his party. In
doing so, he pursued concerns that he had often discussed throughout his
political career ; Margaret C. Rung points out that Nixon had frequently
3 Similar factors account for Dwight Eisenhower’s interest in reconﬁguring the Republican
Party during the 1950s. Cornelius Cotter, ‘‘Eisenhower as Party Leader, ’’ Political Science
Quarterly, 98 (1983), 255–83; Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties : The Transformation
of the American Party System since the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993),
161–69.
4 See, especially, Milkis, but also Sidney M. Milkis, ‘‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
Transcendence of Partisan Politics, ’’ Political Science Quarterly, 100 (1985), 479–504, and
Sidney M. Milkis, Political Parties and Constitutional Government : Remaking American Democracy
(Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).
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spoken out against the centrality of executive bureaucracy and the mar-
ginality of party to modern American politics.5
The challenge posed by Republican minority status does not solely explain
Nixon’s work as party leader, however. The other part of the explanation for
the idiosyncratic nature of Nixon’s work as party leader is his belief that the
Republicans might escape their minority status and replace the Democrats as
the nation’s majority. Such gains seemed possible within a political climate of
growing conservatism among the electorate and disillusionment with the
Democratic Party. The Emerging Republican Majority, published in 1969 by
Kevin P. Phillips, an aide in the Justice Department, was the most prominent
intellectualization of a belief that Nixon shared with many in and out of
politics during this period.6 At the grass-roots level, the 1960s had seen
signiﬁcant new activism in support of conservative politics and equally
signiﬁcant disenchantment with Democratic politicians and their liberalism.7
Informing Nixon’s work as GOP leader was an understanding that the party
system was undergoing an electoral realignment and that he could take
actions to maximize the beneﬁts to his party of this critical period of political
change.8 Without such a belief, aﬃrmative work in support of the
Republican Party from him was unlikely. Nevertheless, Nixon’s response to
this apparent opportunity for conservative politics was by no means in all
respects helpful for the party. He devised and supervised elaborate strategies
and operations to mobilize an enlarged coalition of electoral support, but
their focus was always personal, seeking to increase his own electoral base,
and only sometimes included an interest in the party.
No President of the modern era arrived in the White House with better
qualiﬁcations than Nixon to tackle the tasks of party leadership. As Dwight
Eisenhower’s Vice President during the 1950s, Nixon led the partisan eﬀorts
of the administration to enthuse grass-roots activists and to secure the
election of Republican oﬃce-holders.9 He then based his struggle to regain
5 Margaret C. Rung, ‘‘Richard Nixon, State, and Party : Democracy and Bureaucracy in the
Postwar Era, ’’ Presidential Studies Quarterly, 29 (1999), 307–23.
6 Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House,
1969).
7 Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors : The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2001) ; Kenneth D. Durr, Behind the Backlash : White Working-
Class Politics in Baltimore, 1940–1980 (Chapel Hill : University of North Carolina Press, 2003),
112–49.
8 Robert Mason, Richard Nixon and the Quest for a New Majority (Chapel Hill : University of
North Carolina Press, 2004).
9 William Costello, The Facts About Nixon : An Unauthorized Biography (New York: Viking,
1960), 93–176.
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the party’s presidential nomination during the 1960s on a record of loyal
support for Republican candidates and on a history of extensive travel to
speak to Republican groups across the nation.10 This equipped him with a
deep knowledge of the party. ‘‘Dick knows almost everything there is to
know about the party’s inner workings and geography, ’’ observed Charles
McWhorter, an aide to Nixon, during the campaign for the presidential
nomination in 1968.11 Throughout this political career Nixon paid serious
attention to the problem of the Republicans’ minority status. Among his
earlier speeches are discussions of strategies that the party should adopt in
search of an electoral majority, and his work as Vice President and as a
presidential candidate encouraged him to engage with these questions still
more thoughtfully.12 Nixon was well prepared in 1969 to lead the
Republicans at such a time of political ﬂux.
This examination of Nixon as party leader concentrates on two forms of
party activity. First, during the midterm campaign of 1970 Nixon sought to
repackage the Republican Party in a form more attractive to the electorate,
with the lines of conﬂict between the parties redeﬁned to the advantage of
Republicans. Second, from 1970 and beyond the elections of 1972 Nixon
sought to boost Republican strength by persuading key Democratic poli-
ticians to change party aﬃliation. In both, Nixon showed an activist
approach to party leadership. He emphasized central decision-making within
an institution that traditionally operated as a loose coalition of interests
and factions and which usually lacked strong leadership. Thus he sought to
promote ideological coherence within a party system usually characterized
by ideological diversity ; he believed that such coherence would beneﬁt his
party by winning increased support among conservative Democrats, whether
politicians or voters. The claim that Nixon was, in these respects, an activist
as party leader does not rely on an argument that he placed his party’s needs
above his own. Instead, he helped the Republican Party in order to help
himself, and he ignored its concerns where they were unconnected with his
political goals.
10 Jules Witcover, The Resurrection of Richard Nixon (New York: Putnam’s, 1970).
11 Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes : The Crisis of the Self-Made Man (1970 ; New York: Mentor,
1971), 17.
12 See, for example, excerpts from a speech by Richard Nixon, Los Angeles County
Republican Assembly, 20 April 1949, PPS 208(1949).17, Richard Nixon Library &
Birthplace, Yorba Linda, California ; letter, Nixon to Raymond Moley, 19 Aug. 1958,
‘‘Moley, Raymond – Correspondence with RN 2 of 2, ’’ box 524, Richard M. Nixon Vice-
Presidential Papers, Laguna Niguel, California ; letter, Nixon to Claude Robinson, 9 April
1960, ‘‘Robinson, Claude 1960 (3 of 3), ’’ box 647, Nixon Vice-Presidential Papers.
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The ambiguous motivation for Nixon’s interest in party matters explains
his neglect of the Republican cause in some important respects. For example,
Nixon failed to demonstrate any leadership of the Republican Party in
Congress. Although his administration developed an ambitious agenda for
reform-minded domestic policy – an agenda which confounded popular
expectations of a Republican Party inclined to conservatism – Nixon did
very little to mobilize the congressional party in support of these initiatives.
Consequently, congressional Republicans oﬀered lukewarm support at best
to Nixon’s ‘‘new American revolution ’’ that notably included a far-reaching
proposal for welfare reform, the Family Assistance Plan.13 This failure of
party leadership partly reﬂected Nixon’s own poor relationship with key
Republicans in Congress.14 It also reﬂected his administration’s relative
weakness in the area of congressional liaison, despite imaginative eﬀorts to
engineer majorities for the administration in Congress, notably within the
‘‘ﬂoating-coalition’’ strategy devised by Bryce Harlow, the ﬁrst chief of
congressional liaison.15 The need to woo congressional Democrats perhaps
reinforced the tendency among many in the White House to neglect
congressional Republicans.
Nixon’s work for the national committee was even less constructive. Like
other Presidents of the period, Nixon believed that the main purpose of the
in-party’s national committee was to serve the political needs of the admin-
istration.16 Because Nixon concluded that the White House was the better
institution for dealing with these needs, he neglected the Republican
National Committee and was even ready to undermine its work. Party leaders
in the states complained that the administration did not act in a suﬃciently
partisan way.17 In 1971, for example, he decided that RNC operations in
areas of special interest to him threatened to interfere with the political
outreach of the White House. Nixon therefore issued instructions that the
relevant parts of the national committee be dismantled.18 The RNC division
13 A. James Reichley, Conservatives in an Age of Change : The Nixon and Ford Administrations
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1981), 130–53.
14 Nigel Bowles, The White House and Capitol Hill : The Politics of Presidential Persuasion (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1987). 15 Reichley, 85.
16 Harold F. Bass, ‘‘The President and the National Party Organization, ’’ in Presidents and Their
Parties : Leadership or Neglect ?, ed. Robert Harmel (New York: Praeger, 1984), 59–89.
17 Memo, Harry S. Dent to Richard Nixon, 28 June 1969, ‘‘Memos to the President 1969 (3 of
3), ’’ box 2, White House Special Files – Staﬀ Member and Oﬃce Files (hereafter WHSF-
SMOF): Harry S. Dent, Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives, College
Park, Maryland (hereafter NPMP).
18 H. R. Haldeman, The Haldeman Diaries : Inside the Nixon White House, CD-ROM (Santa
Monica, CA: Sony Electronic Publishing, 1994), 10 Jan. 1971.
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for ethnic Americans then saw its staﬀ reduced by three-quarters, while the
Mexican American project and the budget for the cultivation of Catholic
voters were both eliminated entirely.19 Leonard Hall, who served as RNC
chair during the 1950s, relayed to the White House his concern that the body
would be ‘‘destroyed’’ by the administration’s political actions.20
These aspects of Nixon’s relationship with his party as President support
the characterization that he was hostile to its cause ; nevertheless, he also
worked to rectify the Republican Party’s minority status. During the midterm
campaign of 1970 he fought to elect more Republicans to Congress, and he
did so not merely through support for the candidates’ eﬀorts. Nixon took
centralized control of the campaign in order to use it as a vehicle by which he
could redeﬁne the lines of party competition to the beneﬁt of the
Republicans. This strategy of party redeﬁnition took as its focus races for
the Senate, where for historical reasons gains were most plausible.21 But its
implications were greater still ; more broadly, the campaign featured the
dissemination of a message that the Republican Party articulated more
eﬀectively the views of a majority on an emerging set of issues.
Nixon’s involvement in the detail of the campaign began with the
recruitment of strong candidates for the Senate, includingGeorgeH. W. Bush
in Texas and Richard Roudebush in Indiana. Nixon even broke a cardinal
rule of party leadership ; he intervened surreptitiously in a Republican pri-
mary when G. Harrold Carswell, his unsuccessful nominee to the Supreme
Court in 1969, staged a challenge to William Cramer. Although Cramer was
his chosen candidate, Nixon was eager to help Carswell and instructed his
friend Bebe Rebozo to ﬁnd funds to support this (ultimately unsuccessful)
challenge.22 The second element of Nixon’s involvement, also intended to
assert centralized control over the campaign, was his management of a
limited portion of its funding. The distribution of money to supplement
funds raised by candidates was usually in hands of the national committee
and congressional campaign committees, but Nixon asked key donors to
19 Letter, Laszlo Pasztor to Charles Colson, 3 May 1971, and memo, Pasztor to Richard
Richards, 29 Apr. 1971, ‘‘H.R.H. Memos – 1971 Jan.–June 1971 (2 of 3), ’’ box 2, WHSF-
SMOF: Charles W. Colson, NPMP.
20 Rose Mary Woods notes, Sept. 1970, ‘‘Hall, Len, ’’ box 28, WHSF-SMOF: President’s
Personal Files, NPMP.
21 The last two elections for these Senate seats – in 1958 and 1964 – had taken place during
particularly bad years for Republican candidates.
22 Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction
(Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 146–47; memo, Nixon to Bebe
Rebozo, 21 Apr. 1970, annotated by Nixon, and memo, Nixon to Dent, 21 Apr. 1970,
‘‘Memos – April 1970, ’’ box 2, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Personal Files.
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send contributions to an administration fund under his control and under the
supervision of his chief of staﬀ, H. R. Haldeman. The fund raised approxi-
mately $1.6 million, which was distributed to the campaigns of selected
Republican candidates.23 George Bush, for example, received $112,000.24
The budget in 1970 for conventional sources of Republican campaign
funding amounted to about $11 million.25
The most signiﬁcant element of Nixon’s work for the Republican Party
was his eﬀort to impose a common theme on the midterm campaign. He
sent his Vice President, Spiro Agnew, on an extensive set of appearances to
talk about this theme, and his aides sent instructions to other candidates
about which points to stress on the stump. Nixon himself undertook mid-
term commitments of a scale unusual for a sitting President, visiting twenty-
three states in total.26 The theme was opposition to what Nixon described as
‘‘ radical liberalism. ’’ Radical liberals were those who opposed him on
Vietnam – an issue of particular importance to his administration – and
those who took a tolerant approach to ‘‘permissiveness ’’ and ‘‘ law and
order ’’ – two cornerstones of controversy at this time. Nixon’s conception
of radical liberalism, by contrast, devalued traditional Republican concerns
about small government and laissez-faire economics. The need to crowd out
discussion of bread-and-butter issues was particularly acute in 1970 because
the state of the economy was weak enough to endanger the in-party’s
prospects.27 But Nixon rejoiced in the arrival of new concerns that related to
the social upheaval of this time and to the emerging criticism of American
foreign policy ; the Republican Party could gain ground through conservative
positions towards developments and by encouraging Democrats to defend
liberal positions.28 ‘‘There’s a realignment going on, ’’ he told his aides at the
23 Memo, Charles Ruﬀ and Roger Witten to Leon Jaworski, 20 Aug. 1974, ‘‘Townhouse 1 of
2, ’’ box 1, Campaign Contributions Task Force File #807 relating to the Townhouse
Investigation, RG 460: Records of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, National
Archives, College Park, Maryland; Bill Peterson, ‘‘GOP ‘Townhouse Operation ’ : The
Underbelly of Politics, ’’ Washington Post, 6 July 1976, A1, A6.
24 Memo, Charles Ruﬀ to Leon Jaworski, 19 August 1974, ‘‘Townhouse 1 of 2, ’’ box 1,
Campaign Contributions Task Force File #807 relating to the Townhouse Investigation,
RG 460 Records.
25 Memo, Rogers C. B. Morton to Dent, 13 October 1969, ‘‘Memos to the President 1969 (3
of 3), ’’ box 2, WHSF-SMOF: Dent.
26 Jeﬀrey Karpf, ‘‘National Party Campaigns for Congress : Trends from 1954–1986, ’’ senior
thesis, Yale University, 1988.
27 Allen J. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy : Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Lawrence : University
Press of Kansas, 1998), 81–83.
28 Haldeman notes, 10 and 11 July 1970, ‘‘H Notes July–September ’70 (July–Aug. 6, 1970)
Part I, ’’ box 42, WHSF-SMOF: H. R. Haldeman, NPMP.
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start of the campaign.29 If they dealt with this realigning opportunity
correctly, he thought, the Republican Party would develop an enduring
advantage among the electorate.
The campaign against radical liberalism was not conventionally partisan; it
did not describe the conﬂict over issues as between Republicans and
Democrats. Because of its minority status, Nixon thought it advisable to
avoid reference to the Republican Party and instead called for a Congress
supportive of the administration, while discussing the perils of radical liber-
alism.30 It was even possible, according to Nixon’s deﬁnition, that radical
liberals were in the Republican Party. He judged it beneﬁcial to his cause to
promote ideological coherence within the party system, believing that there
were more opponents of radical liberalism in the United States than sup-
porters of the Republican Party. Nixon’s interest in blurring the existing lines
of party diﬀerence to the greater beneﬁt of conservative politics led him
eﬀectively to withdraw administration support from a Republican senator
seeking re-election. The Republican was Charles Goodell of New York, who
had oﬀended Nixon on the grounds of his dovish views about the Vietnam
War; the alternative preferred by the administration was James Buckley,
standing as a Conservative. At the same time Nixon did not wish to oppose
friendly Democrats, and he discouraged Arthur Fletcher, his Assistant
Secretary of Labor, from running against Henry ‘‘Scoop’’ Jackson, the
Democratic senator from Washington, his supporter on crucial issues
of foreign policy.31 Not surprisingly, many Republicans did not like these
examples of party leadership.
The campaign against radical liberalism was dramatic. Opening the
campaign in early September, Spiro Agnew associated many Democratic
politicians with the unlawful protest of the era :
The issue is whether a free people operating under a free and representative system
of government will govern the United States, or whether they will cede that power to
some of the people, the irresponsible people, the lawbreakers on the streets and
campuses and their followers, their sycophants, and the people who subscribe to
their activities behind the scenes, the radical liberals.32
29 William L. Saﬁre, Before the Fall : An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1975), 316.
30 Memo, Haldeman to Keogh, 13 July 1970, ‘‘ (HRH – July–August, 1970 Staﬀ Memos – E-
K) (Part II), ’’ box 62, WHSF-SMOF: Haldeman; memo, Nixon to Haldeman, 21 Sept.
1970, ‘‘Memos (Aug.)–September 1970, ’’ box 2, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Personal Files.
31 Memo, Dent to Nixon, 22 Dec. 1969, ‘‘December 16 thru 31, 1969, ’’ box 4, WHSF-
SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files, NPMP; memo, Dent to Brown, 9 Jan. 1970, ‘‘ January 1
thru 15, 1970, ’’ box 4, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
32 Theo Lippman, Jr., Spiro Agnew’s America (New York: Norton, 1972), 212–13.
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He claimed that these radical liberals were ‘‘neo-isolationists in foreign
policy, at a time when neo-isolationism invites communist aggression’’
and ‘‘ social permissivists, at a time when America just can’t stand more
permissiveness if this society is to control the radicalism tearing at its
roots. ’’33 Although Nixon aimed to maintain an elevated tone during his
campaign appearances, in contrast with Agnew, in practice he did not.34
On foreign policy he attacked the ‘‘oﬃceholders and candidates who try to
demean their country and who counsel defeat and humiliation for America, ’’
while on crime he used a famous phrase of Franklin Roosevelt’s to claim that
his opponents had ‘‘all but forgotten the right of innocent people to enjoy
freedom from fear. ’’35 In short, he tried to associate the so-called radical
liberals with the social tumult of the day, and he tried to accuse them of
lacking patriotsm.
Nixon’s intervention in the midterm campaign of 1970 sought to develop
an area of ongoing strength for the party – that is, the opposition to radical
liberalism. In doing so, its short-term aim was to secure the election of more
congressional Republicans, particularly in the Senate. In this eﬀort to boost
Republican fortunes, personal goals were important. First, Nixon wanted to
strengthen his administration by securing a Congress more supportive of his
policies. Legislative acceptance of his foreign policy was an especially con-
sequential consideration. Nixon sought to challenge the growing anti-war
bloc in Congress which questioned his Vietnam policy more and more
vociferously and more and more eﬀectively.36 Second, Nixon believed that a
strong showing in 1970 would help his prospects for re-election in 1972. The
midterm campaign against ‘‘ radical liberalism’’ provided him, he thought,
with an opportunity to develop productive themes against the Democrats
and, more concretely, to wound potential Democratic nominees against his
bid for re-election. Nixon intended the campaign to damage Edmund
Muskie, Edward Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey by branding them leftists
rather than moderates, and thus harm their prospects for 1972.37
But the accomplishments of 1970 failed to realize Nixon’s goals. The
campaign against the radical liberals encountered a number of diﬃculties.
First, the imposition of a common theme on campaigns across the country
33 Robert W. Peterson, ed., Agnew : The Coining of a Household Word (New York: Facts on File,
1972), 125. 34 Haldeman, Diaries, 12 Oct. 1970.
35 ‘‘Suggested Basic Campaign Text, ’’ 13 Oct. 1970, ‘‘October 1970, Basic Campaign Text, ’’
box 61, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Personal Files.
36 Elizabeth B. Drew, ‘‘The White House Hard Hats, ’’ Atlantic, Oct. 1970, 54–56.
37 Haldeman, Diaries, 26 Sept. 1970 ; memo, Haldeman to Bryce Harlow, ‘‘HRH-Staﬀ
Memos-HRH September, 1970 D-J, ’’ box 64, WHSF-SMOF: Haldeman.
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failed when some Republican candidates did not follow Nixon’s strategy.
A notable example was Clark MacGregor, the President’s chosen candidate
in Minnesota against Hubert Humphrey, the former Vice President and the
Democratic presidential candidate in 1968. To the concern of Nixon’s
political aides, MacGregor declined to follow guidance from the White
House about how he should run his campaign against Humphrey.38 Second,
Democratic candidates refused to stand silent as they were branded radical
liberals. Members of Congress were wise to Nixon’s eﬀort to identify them as
soft on crime and soft on drugs – a key strand of the ‘‘permissiveness ’’
which radical liberals supposedly condoned. During the autumn Congress
passed two important measures to challenge this characterization. The ﬁrst
was the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,
strengthening penalties for drugs oﬀences and extending programmes
against drug abuse. Second, both houses of Congress also passed versions
of an Omnibus Crime Control Act that increased spending on anti-crime
initiatives.39 The same resistance to the radical liberal strategy appeared on
the campaign trail. In Illinois, for example, Ralph Smith, the incumbent
senator, accused his challenger, Adlai Stevenson III, of radical liberalism.
‘‘When I see Adlai, ’’ Smith said, ‘‘ I see red. ’’ Stevenson challenged such
accusations. He wore a ﬂag pin in his lapel and made it clear that he was no
radical, speaking of the need for tough responses to violent crime.40 When in
Florida William Cramer invoked the same strategy, the argument that his
opponent, Lawton Chiles (a self-described ‘‘progressive conservative ’’), was
a radical lacked credibility.41 The same was true in other states, including
Utah, Wyoming and Texas, where George H. W. Bush’s Democratic
opponent was not liberal Ralph Yarborough after all, but instead the
decidedly more conservative Lloyd Bentsen.42
Judged by the results of these midterm contests, the strategy to strengthen
the Republican contingent in Congress and, more ambitiously still, to redraw
the lines of party conﬂict failed ; there was little return for Nixon’s activist
38 Memos, Haldeman to Murray Chotiner, 7 and 24 Sept. 1970, ‘‘HRH-Staﬀ Memos-HRH
September, 1970 B–C, ’’ box 64, WHSF-SMOF: Haldeman.
39 Congress and the Nation, Vol. 3 : 1969–1972 (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1973),
256–77.
40 Steven V. Roberts, ‘‘Conservatives Press Campus Unrest Issue, ’’ New York Times, 11 Oct.
1970, 70.
41 Bartley and Graham, Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction, 147 ; Philip D. Carter, ‘‘ It
Really IS a Footrace in Florida, ’’ Washington Post, 25 Oct. 1970, B1.
42 Frank H. Jonas and Dan E. Jones, ‘‘The 1970 Elections in Utah, ’’ Western Political Quarterly,
24 (1971), 339–49; John B. Richard, ‘‘The 1970 Elections in Wyoming, ’’ Western Political
Quarterly, 24 (1971), 363–68 ; The Economist, 31 Oct. 1970, 44–45.
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endeavours. First, the midterm elections failed to change the balance in
Congress either to the beneﬁt of Republicans or to the detriment of radical
liberals. On the one hand, Republicans made two gains in the Senate, and
some key targets of the administration were defeated, including Albert Gore
in Tennessee and Charles Goodell in New York. On the other hand, there
was a net loss of twelve seats for the Republicans in the House, and many of
Nixon’s candidates for the Senate were defeated, including George H. W.
Bush and Clark MacGregor. Indeed, on the important issue of Vietnam, the
new Congress was marginally, if not notably, more critical of Nixon.43
Although by historical comparison these results were a respectable midterm
showing for the in-party, they were a disappointment in light of the energy
invested by the administration in the campaign. Second, it was widely agreed
that the costs of the campaign were high for Nixon, because much of the
press reaction to its aggressiveness was hostile. There was little doubt among
White House aides that the stress on radical liberalism had worked to
Nixon’s personal disadvantage, instead of inﬂicting damage on key
Democrats.44 Third, and most important for party-building, there was no
evidence that the campaign had changed popular ideas about the party sys-
tem and the ideological divisions at its heart. Polls conducted by the White
House during the campaign suggested that many people remained unaware
of the administration’s campaign against radical liberalism. Those who knew
about it responded in a partisan way ; Republican voters viewed the admin-
istration’s message favourably, Democratic voters unfavourably.45 In short,
there was no party redeﬁnition. Nixon’s goals had been ambitious ; his
accomplishments were unimpressive.
The second main strand of Nixon’s party-building initiatives involved a
strategy of recruitment. Like the strategy of redeﬁnition, this sought
Republican gains by blurring the lines of diﬀerence between the two parties.
But rather than pursuing new issues that polarized public opinion, the
recruitment strategy sought to strengthen the Republican contingent in
Congress and the states by persuading conservative Democratic politicians,
particularly those from the South, to join the GOP. It was clearly necessary
to convince them that the Republican Party was not only more ideologically
43 Charles DeBenedetti with Charles Chatﬁeld, An American Ordeal : The Antiwar Movement of the
Vietnam Era (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 293.
44 See, for example, memo, Ray Price to Nixon, 13 Nov. 1970, memo, William Saﬁre to
Nixon, 11 Nov. 1970, and memo, Herbert Klein to Nixon, 11 Nov. 1970, ‘‘November
1970, ’’ box 8, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
45 Memo, David R. Derge to Haldeman, 13 Oct. 1970, ‘‘HRH, Derge, Summaries, Memos,
Analyses, ’’ box 403, WHSF-SMOF: Haldeman.
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congenial than the Democratic, but also a better place to pursue their
political ambition. It was a good time for a Republican President to make this
argument, because some Southern Democrats were under attack in two ways
within their own party. First, liberals were questioning with increasing
eﬀectiveness the institutional advantages of the conservative South in
Congress and especially in the House.46 The future of those advantages was
therefore in jeopardy. Second, the importance of moderates at the state and
local levels was growing in parts of the South, thus challenging the con-
servatives’ control of the Democratic Party.47 Their yearning to hold on to
political power therefore had the potential to interest some Southern con-
servatives in a switch to the Republican Party, although the diversity of
politics in the South varied the likelihood of this prospect from state to
state.48
But the prospect of conversions among Democrats dismayed those
Republicans who wanted their party to win the support of a new moderate
South, not that of an old South of economic elitism and of racial conserva-
tism.49 Some had devoted considerable energy to building exactly such a
party, and the arrival of such Democrats in their party would be a blow to
this vision, as well as to the political ambitions of many existing Republicans.
Although the overall climate of the Republican Party was becoming more
conservative during this period, this was not a development to which a party
leader was expected to contribute.50 Presidents generally avoided overt
intervention in any matter involving inter-factional dispute ; Nixon’s
willingness to do otherwise – in opposing Goodell as well as in wooing
conservative Democrats – more identiﬁes him as a party leader ready to
impose his vision for its future than demonstrates a cooperative and more
neutral approach to this area of presidential responsibility.
46 John F. Manley, ‘‘The Conservative Coalition in Congress, ’’ in Congress Reconsidered, ed.
Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (New York: Praeger, 1977), 90–93.
47 Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics : Social Change and Political
Consequence since 1945 (1976 ; rept. New York: Meridian, 1977), 38–40.
48 On variety within Southern politics see Earl Black and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern
Republicans (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 72–137.
49 See, for example, Republicans for Progress, ‘‘Southern Project Report, ’’ 13 Apr. 1966,
‘‘Congress of Republican Organizations 1964–68, ’’ box 2, Political Files, Walter N. Thayer
Papers, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa.
50 On the rise of conservatism within the Republican Party and the decline of liberalism see
Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties : The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill :
University of North Carolina Press, 1995) ; Nicol C. Rae, The Decline and Fall of the Liberal
Republicans : From 1952 to the Present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) ; and David
W. Reinhard, The Republican Right since 1945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983).
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The ﬁrst opportunity to win the conversion of a key Democrat arrived in
1970. James Sweeney has chronicled the assiduous work of Nixon in
‘‘project Okinawa, ’’ designed to persuade Harry Byrd, Virginia’s incumbent
senator, to switch to his party after the 1970 election or at least to vote
for Republican organization of the Senate. Byrd had decided to run for
re-election as an independent when his prospects for the Democratic
nomination looked bleak, because the inﬂuence of his Byrdite faction was in
decline.51 To the consternation of Republicans in Virginia, the President then
declined to support their candidate, Ray L. Garland, considered a model
‘‘new-Southern’’ politician, in order to pursue Byrd.52 This cultivation of
Byrd was a particular disappointment for the state’s mountain valley
Republicans who sought to promote a moderate alternative to the Byrdite
Democrats, although their fellow Republicans in the north and east of the
state took a much more conservative approach to politics.53 Despite these
costs to party harmony, project Okinawa failed. Traditional loyalties to his
fellow conservative Democrats reinforced Byrd’s disinclination to contribute
to the decline of Southern power in Congress, and he voted for Democratic
organization of the Ninety-Second Congress. In the view of the Nixon
administration, moderate Governor Linwood Holton, who supported
Garland’s candidacy against Byrd, acted in ways that obstructed an eﬀort to
boost Republican fortunes in Virginia and the South.54
Instead of Byrd the symbol of the conversion eﬀort became John
Connally, whom Nixon appointed as Treasury Secretary near the end of
1970. The former Governor of Texas, popularly if inaccurately linked with
Lyndon Johnson, Connally remained a Democrat while serving in the Nixon
administration. The presence in the Cabinet of a politician from the oppos-
ing party was by no means unusual, but the prominence of the role that
Connally would play in the Nixon administration and, so Nixon hoped, in a
reshaped Republican Party was most unusual. Connally, as a Democrat,
became a central ﬁgure in Nixon’s re-election campaign of 1972 as the leader
of ‘‘Democrats for Nixon. ’’ Nixon had, in fact, wanted Connally to take over
as Vice President on his way to the presidency in 1976; he brieﬂy thought of
nominating Agnew to the Supreme Court to create a vacancy before swiftly
51 James R. Sweeney, ‘‘Southern Strategies : The 1970 Election for the United States Senate in
Virginia, ’’ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, 106 (1998), 165–68.
52 Letter, Harry Flemming to Nixon, 22 Oct. 1969, ‘‘ (CF) PL/ST #33–51 (Political Aﬀairs)
(1969–70), ’’ box 47, White House Special Files – Central Files (Conﬁdential Files), NPMP.
53 Sweeney, 167–68.
54 Frank B. Atkinson, The Dynamic Dominion : Realignment and the Rise of Virginia’s Republican
Party Since 1945 (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1992), 210–15.
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deciding that the Senate might well not conﬁrm him. Just as many Virginia
Republicans viewed the prospect of Byrd’s conversion with alarm, so some
Republicans were unenthusiastic about Connally as the face of their party’s
future. ‘‘Frankly, I don’t think the Houston Petroleum Club is a very ﬁrm
footing for a new Republican majority, ’’ wrote Douglas Hallett, a young
conservative working as a White House aide, in August of 1972. He thought
it unwise that the party should ‘‘become a refuge for antidiluvian [sic]
southern Democrats. ’’55
The launch of Democrats for Nixon, which played a very prominent role
in the 1972 campaign, was the source of particular frustration for
Republicans. In downplaying his Republican identity and in emphasizing his
ideological aﬃnity with leading Democrats, Nixon was apparently guilty
more than ever of party neglect. Because of the Republicans’ minority status,
Nixon’s personal interest in securing re-election came into conﬂict with any
desire to win conversions and thus to build the party. In 1972 Nixon sought
the endorsement of leading Democrats, but he did not want these
Democrats to transfer to the Republican Party ; the political symbolism of
an endorsement from a disaﬀected Democrat was far more powerful
evangelism than that of support from a new Republican.
This personal consideration damaged the most ambitious strand of the
recruitment strategy, a Republican takeover of the House of Representatives
by mass conversion of Democrats. Although few Democrats in the Senate
were as ready as Byrd to consider a change of party, House Democrats were
more likely to switch. In early 1971 Nixon discussed with Republican leaders
in the House the possibility of creating a congressional coalition between
Republicans and conservative Democrats, thus formalizing and in-
stitutionalizing the conservative coalition which had emerged during the later
years of the New Deal.56 As campaign season approached in summer 1972,
House minority leader Gerald Ford returned to the idea. He wished to
exploit the Nixon campaign’s cultivation of Democratic leaders and voters,
using the argument that their candidate, George McGovern, was too left-
wing for their party’s traditions. Ford hoped that this theme might boost
the numbers of the Republican contingent in the House through what he
called ‘‘operation switch[-]over. ’’ But Nixon was now unenthusiastic about
the idea, sure that fewer Democratic voters would support him if they
decided by party rather than between individual politicians. He therefore
55 Memo, Douglas Hallett to Colson, 10 Aug. 1972, ‘‘Political Strategy 1972, ’’ box 99, WHSF-
SMOF: Colson.
56 Memo, Haldeman to ﬁle, 5 May 1971, ‘‘Beginning May 2, 1971, ’’ box 85, WHSF-SMOF:
President’s Oﬃce Files.
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discouraged this congressional initiative to build the party at least until after
the election.57
Despite his involvement in project Okinawa just two years before, Nixon
not only discouraged ‘‘operation switch-over, ’’ but even oﬀered help to
conservative Democrats who had supported him, especially on foreign pol-
icy. This aid extended beyond congressional diplomacy; it encompassed
tangible help for the campaigns of incumbent Democrats.58 In 1972 the
administration withheld help from the Republican candidates standing
against Senators James Eastland in Mississippi and John McClellan in
Arkansas ; both Eastland and McClellan had loyally supported Nixon on
Vietnam, and it was thought that Eastland, like Byrd, was a potential convert
to the Republicans.59 In a meeting with Eastland, Nixon said that he,
McClellan and John C. Stennis of Mississippi ‘‘had been helped to the
Administration and voted better than a lot of Republicans. ’’60 Many other
congressional Democrats – up to seventy-six in the House – beneﬁted from
Nixon’s disinclination to oppose those friendly to his administration,
especially with respect to its Vietnam policy.61 In some cases, Nixon not only
discouraged opposition to conservative Democrats but also oﬀered them
more active forms of assistance. He told his daughter, Tricia Nixon Cox, to
endorse the candidacies of Eastland and McClellan when she visited the
South during the campaign.62 Moreover, he invited a number of incumbent
House Democrats from the South to the White House for a photo
session – a signiﬁcant act when many Republican candidates justiﬁably felt
that they were receiving no help of any kind from the administration.63
The personal advantage for Nixon of association with a popular incum-
bent was obvious. The disadvantage for Republican candidates was equally
57 Haldeman, Diaries, 21 July 1972.
58 On Nixon’s continuing interest in maintaining good relations with conservative Democrats
in Congress see, for example, memo, Haldeman to Chapin, 27 Nov. 1970, ‘‘HRH – Staﬀ
Memos – C December, 1970, ’’ box 67, WHSF-SMOF: Haldeman; and memo, Raymond
Price to ﬁle, 5 Nov. 1971, ‘‘Cabinet – 11/5/71, ’’ box 119, WHSF-SMOF: President’s
Personal Files.
59 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978),
669 ; Manley, ‘‘Conservative Coalition in Congress, ’’ 95 ; R. W. Apple, Jr., ‘‘Nixon Seeking
Re-election of Eastland, a Democrat, ’’ New York Times, 1 Oct. 1972, 46.
60 Memo, William E. Timmons to Nixon’s ﬁle, 9 Oct. 1972, ‘‘October 8 (1972), ’’ box 90,
WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
61 Washington Post, 21 Mar. 1973, A6; Harry S. Dent, The Prodigal South Returns to Power (New
York: Wiley, 1978), 223. 62 Haldeman, Diaries, 26 Sept. 1972.
63 Memos, John E. Niedecker to ﬁle, 12 and 14 Sept. 1972, ‘‘Beginning September 10,
(1972), ’’ box 89, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files ; memo, Niedecker to ﬁle, 18 Sept.
1972, ‘‘Beginning September 17 (1972), ’’ box 89, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
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obvious. It would be helpful for the Republican Party at large only if some of
these Democrats decided to convert as well as support Nixon in 1972. Where
an opportunity to win conversions was consistent with his own political
goals Nixon promoted that prospect. In August he invited a group of
Virginia Democrats to the White House. The group was led by Mills
Godwin, the state’s former Governor, who had formed a 1200-strong
committee of Virginians for the President. Nixon spoke to the group of his
admiration for Harry Byrd and he ‘‘ indicated his interest in realignment of
the political parties along moderate-conservative and liberal lines. ’’64
Following this meeting, Richard Obenshain, chairman of the state
Republican Party, requested a similar invitation for Virginia Republicans.65
But although an invitation to the White House was forthcoming, it did not
include an appointment with the President.66
With the endorsement of prominent Democrats and the defection of
many Democratic voters to his support, Nixon won a landslide victory in
1972. Nixon called his coalition of Republicans, Democrats and independent
voters a ‘‘new majority. ’’ It was a personal victory, and Republicans did not
make gains elsewhere. If Republican gains were to arrive on the basis of
cross-party conversions, the aftermath of the 1972 election was the critical
moment. There was indeed talk at this time in Washington and even at the
White House about the possibility of a mass conversion in Congress.67 But
Ford’s ambition to become Speaker of the House through operation switch-
over was not realized. According to investigations by Godfrey Hodgson, the
approach of the Watergate scandal dissuaded Democrats from changing
party.68 By contrast, according to the research of A. James Reichley, the
shortness of Nixon’s coat-tails in 1972 meant that the margin between
Republicans and Democrats remained too wide for conversions to bridge.
Interviews with politicians which Reichley later conducted suggest that about
twenty Democrats in the House were potential converts, while twenty-six
64 Memo, Dent to ﬁle, 7 Aug. 1972, ‘‘Beginning August 6 (1972), ’’ box 89, WHSF-SMOF:
President’s Oﬃce Files.
65 Letter, Richard D. Obenshain to Colson, 9 Aug. 1972, ‘‘Support for Nixon, ’’ box 115,
WHSF-SMOF: Colson.
66 Memo, Colson to Dent, 16 Aug. 1972, memo, Dent to Colson, 17 Aug. 1972, and letter,
Howard to Obenshain, 18 Aug. 1972, ‘‘Support for Nixon, ’’ box 115, WHSF-SMOF:
Colson.
67 William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow, 1984), 251 ;
Haldeman, Diaries, 2 Dec. 1972.
68 Godfrey Hodgson, The World Turned Right Side up : A History of the Conservative Ascendancy in
America (Boston: Houghton Miﬄin, 1996), 123–27. The claim wins support in Melvin
Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 1999), 243.
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Democrats were necessary to secure Republican organization of the
House.69 Limited evidence from the White House suggests that its own
estimate of possible recruits was lower rather than higher, thus supporting
Reichley rather than Hodgson.70 Nevertheless, for diﬀerent reasons, both
views attach responsibility to Nixon for the failure of operation switch-over.
Noting that the claims are ‘‘diﬃcult to verify, ’’ Julian Zelizer points out that
the talk of possible conversions ‘‘ reﬂects the tension that existed inside
Congress at this time’’ surrounding liberals’ reform plans that would
undermine the inﬂuence of conservative Democrats.71
The results of the recruitment strategy outside Congress were barely more
impressive. John Connally, the ﬁgurehead of Democrats for Nixon and, in
Nixon’s view, the face of America’s political future, switched to the
Republicans in the spring. For Connally it was clear that he could not realize
his presidential ambitions in the Democratic Party but he might in a
Nixonian Republican Party.72 But even Connally had little enthusiasm for
his new political home as the Watergate scandal hit ; George H. W. Bush,
the new national chairman, soon reported that, despite Nixon’s desire
to promote him as a leading spokesman for the administration, Connally
had turned down at least 400 invitations to speak before Republican
groups.73
Beyond Connally, there were few new recruits, although Agnew travelled
to the South at the end of 1972 where he made a direct appeal for converts ;
he argued that Southern Democrats and Republicans shared an anti-
government approach to politics.74 A handful of Connally Democrats in
Texas switched, continuing the Republican trend there.75 More promising
was the situation in Virginia. In February State Chairman Obenshain
reported that former Governor Godwin had agreed to accept the Republican
69 James Reichley interview with Bud Shuster, 6 Oct. 1977, ‘‘Shuster, Bud, ’’ box 2, A. James
Reichley Interviews, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; James Reichley inter-
view with William Timmons, 29 Nov. 1977, ‘‘Timmons, William, ’’ box 1, Reichley
Interviews ; James Reichley interview with Joe Waggoner, 8 Feb. 1978, ‘‘Waggoner, Joe, ’’
box 2, Reichley Interviews.
70 Memo, Richard K. Cook to Timmons, box 17, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
71 Julian E. Zelizer, On Capitol Hill : The Struggle to Reform Congress and Its Consequences, 1948–2000
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2004), 137.
72 James Reston, The Lone Star : The Life of John Connally (New York: Harper & Row, 1989),
453–54.
73 Memo, Rose Mary Woods to Richard Nixon, 19 Jun. 1973, ‘‘Bush, George, ’’ box 6,
WHSF-SMOF: President’s Personal Files.
74 Speech by Agnew, 12 Dec. 1972, ‘‘Operation Switch Over – Tallahassee, Florida, ’’ box 10,
subseries 7, series III, Spiro T. Agnew Papers, University of Maryland, College Park.
75 Carolyn Barta, ‘‘Texas House Ex-Speaker Joins GOP, ’’ Washington Post, 15 May 1973, A4.
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nomination in the gubernatorial race of 1973.76 The conversion of
Democrats in the state assembly was likely to follow, provided that
Republicans honoured their seniority and demonstrated what Godwin
called ‘‘patience and ﬂexibility. ’’77 By 1974 the Republican Party in
Virginia was strong enough that the state at last fully enjoyed a two-party
system.78
It was not just in the South where recruits were sought in 1973, and it was
not just in the South where the eﬀort was a failure. Nixon hoped to welcome
at least one urban conservative from the North to the Republican Party, too.
The key target was Frank Rizzo, the Democratic Mayor of Philadelphia who
endorsed Nixon in 1972; in return Philadelphia received some impressively
large infusions of federal money.79 But Rizzo resisted the argument that as a
Republican, not as a Democrat, he was a strong contender to become
gubernatorial nominee.80 He remained a Democrat, at least in the short to
medium term, and he remained Mayor of Philadelphia.
Altogether, the recruitment strategy enjoyed little more success than the
redeﬁnition strategy. The Republican Party picked up a number of new re-
cruits, but neither in Congress nor in any of the states did mass conversions
take place to bring new areas of political control to the Republicans. It is,
indeed, not clear that the recruitment strategy won over any Democrats who
would otherwise have remained in the Democratic Party. Conﬂict within the
Democratic Party and the frustration of personal ambition account for the
conversions, not recruitment eﬀorts on the Republican side. Nixon’s own
contribution to the process was sometimes weak. While he energetically
cultivated Harry Byrd, and he happily contemplated the transfer of con-
servative Democrats to the Republican Party, his desire to secure a large
personal victory in 1972 undermined the conversion eﬀort.
76 Memo, Ed DeBolt and Jim Galbraith to George Bush, 22 Feb. 1973, ‘‘February 16–28,
1973, ’’ box 20, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
77 Memo, Flanigan to Nixon, 26 Feb. 1973, annotated by Timmons, ‘‘ (CF) PL/ST# (Political
Aﬀairs) (1971–74), ’’ box 47, White House Special Files – Central Files (Conﬁdential Files).
78 Monroe Lee Billington, The Political South in the Twentieth Century (New York: Scribner’s,
1975), 166.
79 Memo, John Ehrlichman to Richard Nixon, 20 July 1972, annotated by Nixon, ‘‘ July
16–31, 1972, ’’ box 18, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files ; memo, Bud Krogh to
Ehrlichman, 18 July 1972, ‘‘ July 16–31, 1972, ’’ box 18, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce
Files ; memo, Krogh to Cole, 13 Sept. 1972, ‘‘ (Memos, September 1972), ’’ box 5, WHSF-
SMOF: Egil M. Krogh, NPMP.
80 Memo, George Bush to Nixon, 8 Mar. 1973, annotated by Nixon, ‘‘March 1–10, 1973, ’’
and memo, Bruce Kehrli to H. R. Haldeman, 13 Mar. 1973, ‘‘March 11 thru 31, 1973, ’’ box
21, WHSF-SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files.
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After the landslide of 1972 the imperative of re-election was no longer a
factor for Nixon. He began to think about a new strategy for party-building
at this time, one more conventional than the others. He paid more attention
to the national committee. It was time, he decided, for the party assume
responsibility for consolidating the ‘‘new majority ’’ which supported him in
1972.81 He began to develop a new vision for the national committee, which
‘‘would be upgraded, ’’ he said, and ‘‘dedicated to campaign management and
candidate recruitment. ’’82 But as Nixon showed more interest in the national
committee, some Republicans were concerned about the centralizing nature
of his plans. Members of the Ripon Society, a group of liberal Republicans,
claimed that Nixon sought ‘‘ the creation of the ﬁrst ever national political
machine in American history, ’’ to the detriment of local organizations.
‘‘They could have encouraged, ’’ wrote Cliﬀord Brown, ‘‘ the election of
candidates who would play ball with the team while discouraging the election
of others. ’’83 But this third potential initiative of party-building – a strategy
of organizational revitalization and centralization – fell victim to the
Watergate scandal.
The Watergate scandal would, of course, cause yet further problems for
the Republican Party in the mid-1970s. But even in the absence of Watergate,
Republican activists had little reason to see Nixon as an eﬀective leader of
their party. Despite the talk of a conservative opportunity at this time, the
Republican Party was not stronger in 1973 than it had been in 1969. It did
not have a signiﬁcantly larger number of elected politicians in oﬃce, and the
party’s popularity among the electorate was no greater. In short, Nixon had
not successfully tackled the problem of the party’s minority status. Despite
this poor outcome, Nixon had been an activist as party leader. He pursued
some imaginative strategies to build the party where they were consistent
with his own political goals within a context of candidate-centred electoral
politics, and he did so to a greater extent than his immediate predecessors in
the White House.
Nixon had a ready explanation for the failure of his party-building
initiatives. He placed the blame not on the shortcomings of those initiatives,
81 Nixon, RN, 769 ; memo, Timmons to ﬁle, 28 Nov. 1972.
82 Memo, Timmons to ﬁle, 28 Nov. 1972, ‘‘Beginning November 26 (1972), ’’ box 90, WHSF-
SMOF: President’s Oﬃce Files ; memo, by Haldeman, 8 Jan. 1973, ‘‘Action Memos 1973, ’’
box 113, WHSF-SMOF: Haldeman; memo, Buchanan to ﬁle, 30 Nov. 1972, ‘‘November
1972, ’’ box 2, WHSF-SMOF: Patrick J. Buchanan, NPMP.
83 The Ripon Society and Cliﬀord W. Brown, Jr., Jaws of Victory : The Game-Plan Politics of 1972,
the Crisis of the Republican Party, and the Future of the Constitution (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974),
236–38.
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but on his fellow Republicans. In response to the disappointing results of the
1970 midterm campaign he complained to Haldeman that the Republican
candidates were ‘‘ so poor ’’ they had failed to inspire any enthusiasm among
the electorate.84 Similarly, in 1972, he complained to a journalist that his party
had ‘‘a lot of lousy candidates. ’’85 Nixon’s frustration with the Republican
Party as an electoral vehicle is revealed most acutely by his tendency to talk
with his aides from time to time about the desirability of a new Conservative
Party as a replacement for the Republican Party.86 This self-serving expla-
nation carries little weight in explaining what happened during this period.
His contemptuous attitude towards the Republican Party does, however,
help us to understand why his approach to party leadership was adversarial
and centralizing in nature, rather than cooperative and respectful of localism.
It also helps to explain the more positive consequences of Nixon’s concern,
which was to emphasize candidate recruitment in the aftermath of the 1972
elections.
When Nixon’s initiatives are viewed within modern political history more
broadly, they seem more constructive and productive. Over the decades
following Nixon’s presidency, conservative positions on social issues and on
foreign policy were often useful for the party in winning elections.87 The
South gradually became a source of Republican strength in Congress as well
as a fertile area for the party’s presidential candidates.88 Moreover, there are
some similarities between Nixon’s conception after his re-election of a new
role for the national committee and the innovative achievements of the RNC
under William Brock towards the end of the 1970s.89 But there is no clear
link between these developments and Nixon’s leadership. First, the emerg-
ence of a new conservatism within the Republican Party was securely in place
before Nixon’s tenure in the White House, thanks in particular to the
unsuccessful presidential candidacy of Barry Goldwater, and it would receive
84 Notes by H. R. Haldeman, 2 Nov. 1970, in Joan Hoﬀ-Wilson, series ed., Papers of the Nixon
White House, microﬁlm, Part 5 : H. R. Haldeman : Notes of White House Meetings, 1969–1973
(Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989).
85 Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheneum, 1973), 321.
86 Haldeman, Diaries, 11 July 1970 and 17 Jan. 1972 ; John Ehrlichman, Witness to Power : The
Nixon Years (New York: Pocket, 1982), 232–33.
87 Byron E. Shafer, ‘‘The Notion of an Electoral Order : The Structure of Electoral Politics at
the Accession of George Bush, ’’ in idem, ed., The End of Realignment ? Interpreting American
Electoral Eras (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 37–84.
88 Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans ; Joseph A. Aistrup, The Southern Strategy
Revisited : Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South (Lexington : University Press of
Kentucky, 1996).
89 Cornelius P. Cotter and John F. Bibby, ‘‘ Institutional Development of Parties and the
Thesis of Party Decline, ’’ Political Science Quarterly, 95 (1980), 18–19.
482 Robert Mason
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 16 Dec 2013 IP address: 129.215.19.197
fresh momentum under Ronald Reagan. Second, pioneering work on the
development of Republican strength in the South began in the 1950s, and
because of the failure to win many party transfers among Southern
Democrats the Nixon years did not witness any notable quickening of the
pace of the Southern drift towards the GOP. Third, eﬀorts to revitalize the
national committee did not progress under Nixon beyond plans. Brock
instead pursued and expanded an agenda initiated by his 1960s predecessor
as Republican national chair, Ray Bliss.90 Altogether, the location of Nixon’s
party-building initiatives within a longer-term context therefore conﬁrms
their wisdom as ways to boost Republican fortunes, but it also underscores
the lack of shorter-term success achieved by these initiatives.
Ultimately, Nixon was unable to resolve the contradictory impulses
created by the problem of minority status and the promise of majority status.
Although accounts of this period sometimes overlook the signiﬁcance
of Nixon’s work for the Republican Party, they are nevertheless right to
conclude that, where the concerns of candidate-centred politics came into
conﬂict with the goals of party-focussed politics, Nixon retreated to an
obsession with the need to build a new American majority, rather than a new
Republican majority.
90 Philip A. Klinkner, ‘‘A Comparison of Out-Party Leaders : Ray Bliss and Bill Brock, ’’ in
Politics, Professionalism, and Power : Modern Party Organization and the Legacy of Ray C. Bliss, ed.
John C. Green (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 135–48.
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